With soaring food prices in recent years has come alarm about rising poverty in the developing world. Less appreciated, however, is that many of the poor in agricultural economies may benefit from higher wages. This paper finds that wages for manual labor in rural India, both within and outside agriculture, rose faster in districts growing more of those crops with large producer price run-ups over the 2004-09 period. Based on a general equilibrium framework that accounts for such wage gains, rural households across the income spectrum are found, contrary to more conventional welfare analysis, to benefit from higher agricultural prices.
Introduction
Elevated food prices over the last half decade have provoked a rash of government interventions in agricultural markets across the globe, often in the name of protecting the poor. Of course, it is well recognized that many poor households in developing countries, especially in rural areas, are also food producers and hence net beneficiaries of higher prices.
1 Even so, there is another price-shock transmission channel, potentially more important to the poor, that has received far less attention in the literature: rural wages.
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To what extent do higher agricultural commodity prices translate into higher wages? For rural India, home to roughly a quarter of the world's poor (those living on less than $1.25/day), the answer to this question can have momentous ramifications. After all, the vast majority of India's rural population relies on the earnings from their manual labor, most of which is devoted to agriculture. 3 Any thorough accounting of the global poverty impacts of improved terms of trade for agriculture must, therefore, confront rural wage responses in India.
Textbook partial equilibrium analysis (e.g., Singh, Squire, Strauss, 1986 , Deaton, 1989 considers only the direct income effect of a price change on household welfare, which, to a first-order, is proportional to the household's production of the good net of consumption.
While this approach is useful for understanding the very short-run welfare impacts of price shocks, it ignores the inevitable labor market repercussions of persistent price changes. Insofar as higher agricultural prices lead to higher wages, then, there are three channels of general equilibrium welfare effects: (1) higher labor income; (2) lower capital (land) income due to higher labor costs; (3) higher prices for nontradables. To quantify these effects and obtain the full welfare impact of changes in agriculture's terms of trade, one needs, first and foremost, an estimate of the relevant wage-price elasticity.
A few existing studies estimate wage-price elasticities using long aggregate time series data from countries that were effectively autarkic in the main food staple (pre-1980s Bangladesh in Boyce and Ravallion, 1991, and Rashid, 2002 ; the Philippines in Lasco et al., 2008) , thus raising serious endogeneity issues. Alternatively, Porto (2006) estimates the wage impacts of changes in traded goods prices using several years of repeated crosssectional household survey data from Argentina. In the case of agricultural goods, which must somehow be aggregated, Porto creates a price index using household expenditure shares as weights (as does Nicita, 2009 ). To appreciate the issue involved with this strategy, consider an extreme example. Suppose that a country is a net exporter of cotton and net importer of wheat, its sole consumption item. Since the cotton industry is a major demander of labor, a rise in the cotton price should lead to higher wages (and, ultimately, higher welfare); conversely, a rise in the wheat price should have little impact on wages (i.e., only through an income effect on labor supply). Hence, in this scenario, the correlation between changes in wages and changes in the expenditure share weighted agricultural price index may well be close to zero. Clearly, however, this is not the relevant wage-price elasticity for our purposes. Indeed, as I show in the context of a formal general equilibrium trade model, the relevant elasticity is one based on a production share weighted agricultural price index. 4 Even with the correct wage-price elasticity estimate in hand, one must still wrestle with what to do about non-traded goods. One option is to simply ignore them; i.e., by assuming either that they constitute a negligible share of the budget or that their prices are fixed.
Unfortunately, the first assumption is counterfactual, at least in the case of India, and the second assumption is inconsistent with theory. As I will show, in a multi-sector general equilibrium model, in which one of the sectors is nontradable, the price of the nontraded good is increasing in the agricultural price index. Recognizing this possibility, Porto (2006) provides one of the few, if only, econometric estimates of the elasticity of nontraded goods prices with respect to traded goods prices. In India, however, as in most developing countries, reliable data on prices of services and other nontradables are unavailable. One contribution of this paper, therefore, is to quantify the nontradable price elasticity without actually estimating it econometrically.
To evaluate the distributional impacts of changes in agriculture's terms of trade, I integrate a three-sector, specific factors, general equilibrium trade model (e.g., Jones, 1975) into a first-order welfare analysis. 5 Appealing to the widely noted geographical immobility of labor across rural India (e.g., Topalova, 2007 Topalova, , 2010 , 6 I apply this general equilibrium framework at the district level, treating each of these several hundred administrative units as a separate country with its own labor force but with open commodity trade across its borders. 7 This district-level perspective has two implications for empirical implementation of my approach. First, since each district produces a different basket of agricultural commodities, differences in the magnitude of wholesale price changes across crops (even if common across districts), generate cross-district variation in agricultural price (index) changes. Second, following the logic of the model, the wage-price elasticity itself is specific to a district, varying with characteristics of the local labor market.
While my estimation strategy is related to the "differential exposure approach" (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007) employed in studies of the local wage impacts of tariff reform (most recently in Topalova, 2010 , McCaig, 2011 , and Kovak, 2011 , there are several novel elements. Kovak, for example, uses the same type of theoretical model to motivate his empirical specification, but he has many industrial sectors; there is no distinctive treatment of agriculture. Moreover, Kovak ignores intermediate inputs, whereas in this paper intermedi- 5 Another strand of the literature incorporates second-order (substitution) effects of price increases on the consumption side based on demand-system estimation (most recently, Attanasio, et al. 2013 ). Banks et al. (1996) , however, provide evidence that first-order approximations do reasonably well (relative error of around 10%) for price changes on the order of 20%.
6 Kovak (2011) finds no evidence that labor migration matters for local wage responses to trade reform in Brazil, a country with much higher inter-regional labor mobility than India.
7 Capital (land, in agriculture) is also assumed immobile across both districts and production sectors. Longer-run Stolper-Samuelson effects are not of paramount concern in policy discussion of food price shocks.
ates play a quantitatively important role in transmitting food price shocks. Finally, Kovak does not consider the welfare or distributional implications of trade shocks, or of food price shocks more particularly, which is a point of departure for this paper. Topalova (2010) My empirical analysis finds that nominal wages for manual labor across rural India respond elastically to higher (instrumented) agricultural prices.
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In particular, wages rose faster in the districts growing relatively more of the crops that experienced comparatively large run-ups in price over the 2004-5 to 2009-10 period. Importantly, the magnitude of these wage responses is broadly consistent with the quantitative predictions of the specificfactors model. These results have striking distributional implications. Improved terms of 8 In other words, rather than predicting distributional impacts from a model based on estimated elasticities, it looks at changes in poverty rates directly. By contrast, Marchand (2012) uses an ex-ante simulation of household consumption along the former lines to find that the fall in India's trade barriers during the 1990s would have reduced rural poverty in India. 9 In the first place, there were important quantitative restrictions on agricultural trade in India, so it is not clear how agricultural prices were effectively changed by the tariff reductions. Secondly, after allowing for separate impacts of agricultural and industrial tariffs on poverty rates, Topolova (2010, p. 19) finds: "The poverty-tariff relationship seems to be driven by agricultural tariffs." Taken at face value, this suggests that higher food prices would lead to a fall in rural incomes, a conclusion virtually impossible to reconcile with any sensible model of trade. 10 In rural India, manual labor by far predominates over nonmanual labor in terms of annual days worked, and much of the latter is in the public (i.e., nonmarket) sector. Thus, unlike, e.g., Porto (2006) or Nicita (2009), I do not attempt to estimate separate wage-price elasticities for skilled and unskilled workers.
trade for agriculture, rather than reducing the welfare of the rural poor as indicated by the conventional approach (which ignores wage impacts), would actually benefit both rich and poor alike, even though the latter are typically not net sellers of food.
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In the next section, I sketch the theoretical framework and develop my empirical testing strategy. Section 3 discusses the econometric issues and the estimates. Section 4 presents the distributional analysis of food price shocks, comparing the general to partial equilibrium scenarios. I conclude, in section 5, with a discussion of the Government of India's responses to the 2007-08 food price spike, notably its export ban on major foodgrains.
General Equilibrium Framework

Model assumptions
Consider each district as a separate economy with three sectors: agriculture (A) and manufacturing (M ), both of which produce tradable goods, and services (S), which produces a nontradable. The reason it is necessary to distinguish services from manufacturing is simple.
Combining the two into one nontradable nonagricultural sector is tantamount to allowing changes in agricultural prices to affect the prices of both manufactured goods and services.
Since manufactured goods are, in fact, tradable, this approach would overstate the welfare impact of changes in agriculture's terms of trade.
Continuing with the assumptions, output Y i in each sector i = A, M, S is produced with a specific (i.e., immobile) type of capital K i , along with manual labor L i and a tradable intermediate input I i , using sector-specific production function
In the case of agriculture, K A is land and I A is, e.g., fertilizer. Intermediate inputs do not play an essential role, except insofar as the model provides quantitative predictions, in which case (as we will see) they make a big difference. 11 To be sure, the increase in rural wages may lag the increase in consumer prices, and so the conventional analysis may be more appropriate for the very short run. This paper does not speak to the timing issue.
In India, as in most developing countries, agricultural production largely takes place on household-farms using family and hired labor. Moreover, in a given year, these farms typically produce several crops on the same land (contemporaneously via multicropping and/or sequentially in multiple cropping seasons) with largely the same workers and intermediate inputs. Hence, following, e.g., Strauss (1986) Farmers then choose the particular quantities to grow, the Y j , to maximize total revenue, c j=1 P j Y j , where P j is the price of crop j, subject to the constraint that G(Y 1 , ..., Y c ) = Y A for any given Y A . Thus, in this set-up, production value shares
are determined by both agroclimatic conditions and by relative crop prices. Given the homogeneity of G, there exists a price index P A such that P A Y A = c j=1 P j Y j , which upon differentiation yields
where "hats"denote proportional changes; i.e. x = d log x. This establishes our production value share-weighted agricultural price index. Now, we may write profit per acre in agriculture as
with analogous expressions for average profit per unit capital in manufacturing, Π M and in services Π S , given respective output prices in these sectors, P M and P S . I assume that manual labor is perfectly mobile across the three sectors but its overall supply is fixed
Thus, in each district economy, there is one type of labor with a single nominal wage, W , and a unique wage-price elasticity
that must be solved for.
Because this is a general equilibrium framework, income effects of changes in factor prices are fully accounted for. Thus, total income y consists of the sum of value-added (revenue net input expenditures) across sectors i = A, M, S
with an additional exogenous component, E. Though a technical nuisance, the presence of E suits an important empirical purpose: A significant portion of household income in rural India comes from (salaried) nonmanual labor; e.g., teachers, police/army, and other civil servants. The exogeneity assumption on this income can be motivated by thinking about entry into these professions as requiring an advanced level of education (relative to unskilled labor), which cannot be acquired in the short-run. 
Solution and Intuition
We are interested in what happens to the equilibrium wage in this model when the agricultural price index changes, holding other tradable prices constant; i.e., P M = P I = 0. Given that farmers are price-takers in all markets, we have (from price equals unit cost)
where, under constant returns to scale, the input cost shares in agriculture, the α l , l = K, L, I, are such that α K + α L + α I = 1. Similar equations hold for the other sectors, each with its own set of input cost shares. In the interest of clarity and because it will make 12 We can also think of rural nonmanual labor as paid for out of a central government budget financed by urban taxpayers and not contributing directly to output in any rural sector.
no appreciable difference empirically (see below), I assume equal input cost shares across sectors from now on.
As I show in Appendix A,
where the β i = L i /L are the sectoral labor shares and δ ≡ P S / P A . Note that δ, the elasticity of the nontradables price with respect to the price of agriculture, is endogenous and needs to be solved out.
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Before doing so, however, we can gain some intuition for the mechanics of the model by considering the special case α I = β S = 0; a two-input, two-sector economy (without nontradables). According to equation (5) is necessarily very steep; at B it is very flat. Thus, in moving from A to A , a 50% increase in the agricultural price translates into an almost 50% increase in the wage, whereas, in moving from B to B , the same price increase leads to virtually no wage increase whatsoever (in proportional terms).
If we now let α I > 0, then we have even larger wage increase than was the case in the absence of intermediates.
13 Combining (4) and (5) also gives Π A / P A =
. So the elasticity of the return on land with respect to the agricultural price index incorporates the direct (positive) effect of price changes on farm profits as well as the indirect (negative) effect of price induced wage changes.
Finally, let us return to δ in equation (5) . To solve out this parameter, we must equate the demand and supply of services, which I discuss in Appendix A. For purposes of exposition, set α I = 0 again and consider the special case E = 0, in which there is no exogenous source of income outside of the three sectors. As shown in the Appendix, ψ = δ = β A /(1−β S ) > β A in this case. Thus, the introduction of a nontradable sector also amplifies the wage-price elasticity. In this economy, a rise in the wage induced by higher agricultural prices reduces the supply of services; it also increases the demand for services due to an income effect. Both forces put upward pressure on the price of services so that δ > 0. With the expansion of the service sector as agricultural prices rise, the supply curve of labor to agriculture becomes even more inelastic, making the rural wage even more sensitive to these price changes.
Empirical validation
The advantage of the above machinery is twofold: First, the model tells us what the relevant wage-price elasticities are and, second, it delivers explicit expressions for these elasticities in terms of input cost shares, sectoral labor shares, and other parameters, all of which can be computed from nationally representative data collected by India's National Sample Survey (NSS) Organization. 14 I thus calculate district (d) specific wage-price elasticities, ψ d , assuming equal input cost shares across sectors, 15 for 472 districts in the 18 major states of India (See Appendix Table C.1 for descriptive statistics). 16 Generally speaking, the estimated elasticities are high (ψ = 1.15), reflecting large values of β A . Indeed, for the average rural district, around three-quarters of manual labor days (adjusted for efficiency 14 An exception is the share of aggregate income from exogenous sources, or E/y (cf., Appendix A), which is computed at the state-level from IHDS data described below. 15 While it is straightforward to allow for sector-specific input cost shares using the results in Appendix A, it is somewhat messy. Fortunately, it hardly matters, because they yield virtually identical elasticity results as in the equal shares case. Cost shares of value-added for Indian manufacturing and service sectors based on national accounts are available from Narayan et al. (2012) . As it turns out, however, the ratio of capital to labor shares are what is most relevant to our calculations, and these are quite similar across sectors. 16 Excluded are the peripheral states of Jammu/Kashmir in the far north and Assam and its smaller neighbors to the north and east of Bangladesh. Included states, organized into five regions, are North: Harayana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttaranchal; Northwest: Gujarat and Rajastan; Center : Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa; East: Bihar, Jharkhand, and West Bengal; South: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu.
units; see Appendix B.2) are spent in agriculture. Note also that intermediate inputs play a quantitatively important role in the elasticity calculation; if I assume that α I = 0, then ψ would drop to 0.85. In other words, the input amplification effect on the wage-price elasticities, discussed in the previous section, is substantial.
In principle, one could econometrically estimate separate wage-price elasticities for each district and compare them to their theoretically implied counterparts above. In practice, however, this would require long time-series of wages and prices for each district over a period of structural stasis. 17 In lieu of such data, I estimate the regression analog to the identity given by equation (2), or
where c is an intercept, γ is a slope parameter, and ε d is a disturbance term for each district d.
Thus, equation (6) replaces W and P A by their empirical counterparts; ∆w d is the difference in log wages between years t − k and t and the ∆p j are the corresponding time-differences in log prices of crop j, which are weighted by production value shares s d,j as already discussed.
Under the null hypothesis, which is that the model and all its auxiliary assumptions holds true on average, we have γ = 1. In other words, under the null, the magnitude of observed wage responses to actual changes in the agricultural price index correspond (in an average sense) to what the theory says they should be. Several econometric issues arise in implementing equation (6), including potential endogeneity of price changes. These are left for Section 3.4.
17 India's quinquennial labor force survey, available since 1983, would yield, at best, five first-differenced wage observations per district. Alternatively, Jayachandran (2006) examines a 30-year agricultural wage series for Indian districts. Although these data fall entirely within the pre-reform (largely autarkic) trade regime, Jayachandran estimates a national-level wage elasticity with respect to agricultural TFP, instrumented with rainfall shocks. One of the difficulties with interpreting this as an estimate of ψ, however, is that the year-to-year TFP shocks induced by annual rainfall deviations are unanticipated and thus are unlikely to give rise to the sectoral labor reallocations underlying the general equilibrium model of this paper.
Empirical Analysis
Domestic agricultural markets
Since at least the 1960s, Indian governments, both at the national and state level, have intervened extensively in agricultural markets. Interstate trade in foodstuffs is often severely circumscribed through tariffs, taxes and licensing requirements (see Atkin, 2011 , for a review) with some states (e.g., Andhra Pradesh) going so far recently as to prohibit the exportation of rice to other states (Gulati, 2012) . The Government of India also sets minimum support prices (MSPs) at which major food crops are, or at least can be, procured for eventual release into the nationwide public distribution system (PDS). In practice, however, the level of procurement, and thus the extent to which the MSPs are binding, varies greatly by crop and state, and even within states (Parikh and Singh, 2007) . The principal foodgrains, rice and wheat, have, in recent years, been the overwhelming focus of government procurement efforts, concentrated in the states of Punjab and Haryana, often for lack of storage capacity and marketing infrastructure elsewhere. By contrast, procurement of pulses and oilseeds has been minimal, as market prices have consistently exceeded MSPs.
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During and after the sharp run-up in international food prices in 2007-08, the Government of India imposed export bans on rice, wheat, and a few other agricultural commodities in an attempt to tamp down domestic price increases. Meanwhile, over several consecutive years, MSPs for rice and wheat (and most other major crops) were raised substantially, partly in response to international prices; huge stockpiles of foodgrains were subsequently accumulated through government procurement (World Bank, 2010b; Himanshu and Sen, 2011).
The upshot of these interventions is that output prices faced by Indian agricultural producers do not always perfectly track those in international markets. domestic market integration is somewhat limited (especially in the case of rice), there is considerable variability across states in crop price movements. On the one hand, this variation may reflect differential transmission of exogenous price pressure (e.g., because of varying levels of state procurement or exposure to trade, both with other countries and with other states); on the other hand, it may reflect localized supply or demand shocks, which can also drive rural wages directly. Price data for many of the minor field crops and the tree crops are incomplete or not reliable.
Crop prices
Moreover, the associated production data are often inaccurate (especially for vegetables and tree products). I thus select major field crops according to the criteria that they cover at least 1 percent of total cropped area nationally or that at least 5 districts had no less than 10 percent of their cropped area planted to them in 2003-4. These 18 crops, listed in Table   2 in descending order of planted area, comprise some 92 percent of area devoted to field 20 Since sugarcane is sold mostly to mills and not in wholesale markets, I use the national MSP or, when relevant, "State Advised Prices," which tend to be much higher and, hence, closer to international cane pricing standards (see Gulati, 2012) .
crops in 2003-04 in the major states of India. Table 2 also reports national average log-price changes (weighted by the state share of total production) relative to rice. Thus, in the first row, the relative price change for rice is zero, quite negative for several important crops (e.g., cotton, gram, groundnut, mustard/rapeseed) and highly positive for pulses (Urad, Moong, and Arhar). 
Wages
Identification
Rewriting equation (6) to reflect the price data discussed above, I wish to estimate 21 The NSS-EUS categorizes jobs in terms of manual and non-manual labor only for rural, not urban, workers. Based on the 61st round sample of nearly 39,000 individuals, the population-weighted proportions in each category are as follows: 58% in manual-agricultural; 24% in manual nonagricultural; 18% in nonmanual (virtually all in nonagriculture). For the 66th round sample of some 30,000 individuals, the corresponding proportions are 51%, 30%, and 19%, respectively.
where ST AT E d denotes the state in which district d is located. There are two endogeneity issues to contend with: measurement error and simultaneity between wage and price changes.
As to the first issue, both the crop value shares, s d,j , and the crop-specific log-price changes, ∆p ST AT E d ,j , may be measured with error. Putting aside the latter concern momentarily and assuming that measurement error is confined solely to value shares, I could deploy the instrument
where a d,j is the area share of crop j in district d. To be sure, cropped areas may also be measured with error, but these errors should not be correlated with those of crop production and prices.
Clearly, IV 1 d does not deal with measurement error in price changes, which could arise if, e.g., the marketed varieties or grades of a certain crop in a certain state change over time.
Another concern is unobserved district-level shocks (or trends) correlated with both wage and price changes. For instance, suppose that a particular district has been industrializing relatively rapidly over the 2004-09 period, or that it has experienced comparatively rapid technological improvement in agriculture. Both types of shocks would tend to raise district wages. And, they may influence crop prices as well insofar as the state's agricultural markets are insulated from the rest of India (and the world) and the district is important relative to that market, or the shocks are strongly spatially correlated.
The next step, therefore, is to develop an instrument that is uncorrelated both with district-level wage shocks and with measurement error in price changes (and crop value shares). Consider, then,
where ∆p ST AT E d ,j is the production share weighted mean change in the log-price of crop j across states excluding the state to which district d belongs. 22 In other words, IV 2 d replaces the state price changes in IV 1 d with a national average price change uncontaminated by state-specific shocks or measurement error because no price data from that state or production data from that district are used in its construction. The idea, then, is that ∆p ST AT E d ,j reflects exogenous international price changes transmitted to other states of India as well as shifts in demand and supply in the vast domestic market outside of the particular state.
A problem with IV 2 d , however, is that it does not meet the exclusion restriction if the ε d are correlated across state boundaries. In other words, if industrialization or agricultural innovation (or even weather) in, say, southern Andhra Pradesh and northern Tamil Nadu move together, then the ∆p ST AT E d ,j for a district in Andhra Pradesh may reflect these shocks inasmuch as price changes from Tamil Nadu contribute to the weighted average.
To deal with this concern, I first establish some notation: Let BST AT E 
where ∆p BST AT E r d ,j is the production share weighted mean change in the log-price of crop j across states excluding those in BST AT E r d . Here, again, the logic is that the price instrument should not directly, or, in this case, even indirectly, be driven by local shocks that also determine differential wage growth across districts (and states).
The choice of r, the radius of "influence" of local wage shocks on prices in bordering states may seem arbitrary. Since, on average, districts are 57 kilometers apart (centroid-tocentroid), at r = 100 kilometers, the sets BST AT E Table 2 
Inference
As already alluded to, the error term ε d is likely to be correlated across neighboring districts, 
Estimation results
Estimates of γ based on equation (7) are reported in Table 2 , panel(a), in which identifying assumptions become progressively less restrictive across columns. Thus, column 1 estimates 24 Also note that with only a single (five-year difference) observation per district, serial correlation is not an issue in my set-up. 25 Bandwidth here is the distance cutoff, in degrees of lat/long, beyond which spatial dependence is assumed to die out. Based on simulation evidence from Bester et al. (2011) , I choose a bandwidth of 16; i.e., given the area of my 'sampling region' (the 18 major states of India), this choice should yield minimal test-size distortion across a range of possible spatial correlations. I find these p-values to be highly robust to bandwidth deviations of at least ±4. 26 Although this procedure ignores correlation between numerator and denominator arising from the fact that these two statistics are calculated from partially overlapping samples of the same underlying micro-data, it should serve adequately as a first approximation. Table 2 for all IV regressions. The critical value for the associated weak instrument test, based on 10% maximal size for a 5% Wald test, is 16.4 in all cases (Stock and Yogo, 2002) . Hence, subject to the caveat already noted, I can strongly reject weak identification, even using IV 3 Based on 7-day employment recall information in the NSS-EUS, I compute the population weighted district average days spent in public works employment (both NREGA and other)
for rounds 61 and 66. Table 2 ). Of course, the coefficient on ∆P W does not necessarily reflect the causal impact of NREGA or any other public works employment program in India on rural wages; this specification merely serves as a robustness check.
Sectoral labor mobility
My framework assumes perfect mobility of labor across production sectors over the relevant horizon. However, as noted above, Topalova (2010) proposes an alternative specific-factors model to rationalize her empirical results for India in which labor is perfectly immobile, but capital moves freely, across sectors. It is easy to see that, in this set-up, agricultural wages respond positively to an increase in food prices but nonagricultural wages respond negatively, as capital is reallocated away from the sector whose terms of trade has deteriorated and towards agriculture.
To test perfect intersectoral mobility of labor, I use the same procedure just employed to construct log-wage district fixed effects for the 2004-05 and 2009-10 NSS-EUS rounds, except in this case using only wage data for nonagricultural jobs. The dependent variable is again the time difference of these district fixed effects scaled by ψ d . Relative to the previous analysis, 17 districts are dropped for lack of data on nonagricultural wage jobs. The estimates, in panel (b) of Table 2 , differ little from their counterparts in panel (a), nor can I reject H 0 : γ = 1 in the specifications with the least restrictive identifying assumptions.
Hence, it appears that nonagricultural wages, contra Topalova's implication, respond as positively to higher food prices as do wages overall. Consequently, the resulting welfare gains accruing to manual laborers (through wages) should not depend on the sector in which they happen to be employed.
Food Prices and Welfare
Welfare elasticities
Now consider a rural household embedded within the economy sketched out in Section 2.
Its contribution to aggregate income consists of value-added from its enterprises, both farm and nonfarm, its net earnings from manual labor, and its exogenous income E. The second of these components, which I will denote by
, is not present in equation (3) because manual labor supply (L S ) and demand (L D ) are equal in the aggregate.
Household indirect utility is a function of income and prices, P M , P S , and P j , j = 1, ..., c.
Following the conventional derivation, the proportional change in money-metric utility m is
where
and υ j is the expenditure share of good j (S in the case of services),
is the ratio of gross farm revenue to income,
is the ratio of gross revenue from service enterprises to income, and
is the ratio of the net earnings of manual labor to income. The term Ωs j − ν j is reminiscent of Deaton's (1989) well-known net consumption ratio (revenue minus expenditures on crop j divided by total consumption expenditures) except that, unlike
Deaton's partial equilibrium result, it fully accounts for the changes in factor income induced by a given price change, as well as for changes in the price of nontradables. There are also a couple of differences between equation (11) 
Distributional analysis
The India Human Development Survey (IHDS) of 2005 is a nationally representative household survey of both rural and urban India (Desai et al. 2008 ). Within the 18 major states already discussed, the IHDS covers nearly 24 thousand rural households spread over 254 districts, collecting information on consumption expenditures and income, including revenues and costs from household enterprises, both agricultural and nonagricultural. Figure 2 shows the patterns of λ A and λ S smoothed across percentiles of per-capita expenditures, as represented by the IHDS rural sample. Relative to total household income, gross revenues from both farming and service enterprises increase by percentile, though the former increases much faster. By contrast, because the demand for hired labor across household enterprises increases with wealth, λ L decreases and essentially goes to zero for the highest percentile. On the consumption side (Figure 3) , the behavior of the food share is familiar, falling steadily and quite rapidly by percentile, whereas the share of expenditures on nontraded goods has the opposite, though a less steep, distributional gradient.
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Turn now to the main results in Figure 4 , showing the relationship between the welfare elasticity with respect to food prices, , and per capita expenditure percentile. Observe that is positive across the income spectrum, never falling below 0.4. Thus, higher food prices confer substantial and broad-based benefits to the rural population of India, although the pattern of proportional welfare gains is mildly hump-shaped, with the poorest and richest households gaining least. This latter feature is driven by changes in non-traded goods prices and the relatively large share of expenditures devoted to these goods by the rich. In other words, if δ is artificially set to zero, then would be essentially flat across the top per capita expenditure quintile.
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Finally, let us compare the general equilibrium welfare analysis to a more conventional partial equilibrium one. Of course, the latter assumes that ψ = δ = 0 so that, from equation (11), Ω = λ A . The distribution of partial equilibrium welfare elasticities looks dramatically different than that of (Figure 4 ). Without the large and beneficial adjustment in rural wages, the poorest rural households in India would experience a welfare loss of around 0.2 percent for a 1 percent uniform increase in agricultural prices. However, the relative advantage of the general equilibrium scenario erodes rapidly with income as manual labor earnings become progressively less important in the higher percentiles. Indeed, because in partial equilibrium, the richest households do not have to pay higher prices for services or 29 Nontraded goods expenditure categories include: firewood, entertainment, conveyance, house rental, repair and maintenance, medical care, education, and other services. 30 In Jacoby (2013), I further account for India's vast Public Distribution System (PDS), under which eligible households (generally, those below the poverty line) can purchase fixed rations of either rice, wheat, or sugar in "Fair Price Shops" at below-market prices. If I assume that PDS prices remain stable even as market prices rise, I obtain modestly better welfare outcomes for all but the top two deciles.
higher wages to hired labor, they would benefit even more than in general equilibrium from higher food prices.
Conclusions
In reaction to the food price spike of 2007-08, the Government of India imposed export bans on certain major crops. Such efforts to restrain consumer prices can have the unfortunate side-effect of restraining producer prices as well. My analysis shows that, in the face of higher agricultural commodity prices, a stand-alone export ban, or any policy that mimics its effects, would reduce welfare for the vast bulk of India's population. Moreover, it is precisely the poorest rural households (and, hence, the poorest in India as a whole) that are most harmed by forestalling, or at least delaying, the substantial trickle-down effects of higher crop prices via rural wages.
Partial equilibrium analysis, which assumes fixed wages, provides a highly misleading picture of the distributional impacts of food price shocks among India's vast rural population.
To be sure, the story may be quite different in metropolitan India, where the poor, arguably, benefit little from rising rural wages. 31 Even though not much more than a quarter of India's population resides in cities, urban constituencies are obviously more concentrated than rural ones and, hence, from a political-economy standpoint, are likely to be more pivotal in shaping government policy on such matters as food security.
Finally, this paper speaks to the broader debate on the link between trade and poverty.
Consistent with the WTO's Doha agenda, my results imply that lowering barriers to trade in agricultural goods on the part of developed countries, if only by improving the lot of the rural poor in India, can make a significant dent in global poverty. Meanwhile, the condition that input prices equal respective marginal value products delivers
, where the second equality in each case follows from the total differentiation of the marginal product functions F L S and F I S . Solving these two equations, after first substituting out I S from the second using (A.4), yields
Substituting equation (A.2) into (A.5), equating the result to (A.3), and solving gives
With equal input cost shares, equation (A.6) simplifies to
Finally, as mentioned in the text, E = 0 and
B Parameters computed from NSS data
B.1 Input cost shares in agriculture
The 59th round of the National Sample Survey (NSS59) collected nationally representative farm household data in 2002-03, including information on agricultural inputs and outputs for over 40 thousand farms. The labor cost share is α L = W ( h + f )/ j P j Y j , where h and f are, respectively, hired and family labor in agriculture and the denominator is the value of crop production. We may write the numerator as W h (1 + f ), where f = f / h is the ratio of family to hired labor. For a labor market in equilibrium, f should equal the ratio of the number of agricultural laborers working on their own farm to the number working for wages on other farms. Thus, we can calculate f for each of the five regions (north, northwest, center, east, and south) from individual employment data in NSS61-EUS. Comparable data on hired labor expenses (for regular and casual farm workers), W h , and on total value of crop production are available at the farm-level by season from NSS59. Summing up W h across seasons and households within each region (using sampling weights) multiplying by (1 + f ) and dividing by a similarly computed sum of production value gives the regional labor shares. I use the same approach for the intermediate input shares α I = P I I A / j P j Y j , where the numerator is the total expenditures on non-labor variable inputs as reported in NSS59 (seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and irrigation). The results of these calculations are as follows: There is a persistent daily wage gap between agriculture and nonagriculture, present across all NSS-EUS rounds, which suggests that days spent in agriculture are substantially less productive than those spent in nonagriculture. In particular, an agricultural sector dummy included in a log-wage regression using the NSS64 rural sample attracts a coefficient of -0.243, after controlling flexibly for gender, age, education, and district. Thus, labor productivity is around 24 percent lower per day in agriculture. To account for this productivity difference, I incorporate an efficiency units assumption into the model. In other words, the labor constraint becomes 
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